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Closing a Bankruptcy Loop-Hole
or Impairing a Debtor's Fresh Start?
Sarbanes-Oxley Creates a New
Exception to Discharge
BY LUCIAN MURLEY"
INTRODUCTION
T he Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 ("the
Act"), part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,1 includes changes to many
different areas of the law: accounting and auditing procedures, financial
disclosures, corporate tax law, securities law, and bankruptcy law. The
impetus behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the recent high-profile financial
scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, among others.2
The Act's goal is to guarantee "trust in the financial markets by ensuring
that the corporate fraud and greed may be better detected, prevented and
prosecuted" and to "ensure that such greed does not succeed."3
Although scandals involving other Fortune 500 companies have come
to light since 2001, Enron seems to have garnered most of the attention
from the public and Congress.4 A Texas pipeline company incorporated in
1985, Enron expanded to become an energy broker upon the deregulation
of major power markets.' Enron misled investors and regulators by using
a variety of complicated transactions with putatively separate business
entities designed to bolster purported profits, conceal actual losses, and
. J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky; B.Mus. 1998, Northwestern
University. The author would like to thank Professor Rutheford B Campbell and
Associate Dean Christopher Frost for their help with this Note. The author would
also like to thank Alice Rosenbaum for her inspiration throughout law school.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 800 (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
2 See S. REP. No. 107-146 (2002), 2002 WL 863249, at *2 (statement of
Senator Leahy) [hereinafter Leahy Statement] (stating that the Act is intended to
restore trust in the financial markets after the Enron "debacle").
3 id.
4 See id.
5 Id.
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ultimately boost Enron's share price.6 These practices eventually caught up
with the company and Enron announced a $618 million loss for the third
quarter of 2001, reduced shareholder equity by $1.2 billion, and later filed
the largest bankruptcy in United States history.7 As a result, Enron
shareholders were left with virtually worthless stock.8 The market fallout
from this and other accounting scandals has affected virtually every
American; the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") reported that
the average household lost $60,000. 9
In reaction to these events, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new
bankruptcy provision, section 523(a)(19), that renders debt fromjudgments
for violations of federal or state securities laws and debts incurred through
common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security nondischargeable in bankruptcy.' This new section
was added because Congress perceived that there was a "loophole" in the
existing law governing personal bankruptcy that allowed securities laws
violators to unfairly discharge their debts to defrauded investors."
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of bankruptcy law and
securities regulation. Part II examines the substantive changes section
523(a)(19) makes to the requirements of creditor reliance and debtor
fraudulent intent for a finding of nondischargeability based on fraud. Part
111 offers opinions as to whether section 523(a)(19) is an appropriate
closing of this bankruptcy "loophole."
I. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL CONCEPTS
A. Bankruptcy Law
Every individual bankruptcy case has two goals: resolving creditors'
claims against the debtor and giving the debtor a "fresh start." 2 By far the
61d.
7 Id. WorldCom now holds the record for largest bankruptcy when it filed in
July of 2002. See Shawn Young et al., Leading the News: WorldCom Files for
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, 2002 WL-WSJ 3401243.
8 S. REP. No. 107-146, at *3.
9 Jeanne Cummings & Michael Schroeder, Leading the News: Lesser-Known
Candidates Head List for SEC Chief, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2002, 2002 WL-WSJ
103126320 (noting also that the national exchanges as a whole lost $5 trillion in
market value during the same time period).
'oLeahy Statement, supra note 2, at * 10.
"See id.
12 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,563 (1994) (stating that the
"policies of obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors and
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most common form of bankruptcy is Chapter 7,13 also known as a straight
liquidation bankruptcy. Any person that "has a domicile, a place of
business, or property in the United States" may file a Chapter 7 petition.'
4
After bankruptcy is filed, an independent third party-the bankruptcy
trustee 5 -collects and manages the debtor's bankruptcy estate, liquidates
the assets, and distributes the proceeds to the debtor's creditors.'
6
In exchange for giving up all of his assets, the bankruptcy court
discharges the debtor's obligation to pay old debts.' 7 In the context of
bankruptcy law, "discharge is a release of the debtor from any further
personal liability for his or her pre-bankruptcy debts."' 8 Consequently, if
the debtor owes an unsecured creditor a debt and that debt is discharged in
bankruptcy, the unsecured creditor will only receive a pro rata share of the
assets from the bankruptcy estate. 9 Often, the creditor will receive only
cents on the dollar.20
In other situations, a creditor would be better off if the debtor has
positive earning capacity. In these instances, the debtor retains his property
and pays his creditors with future earnings. This approach is often used for
insolvent corporations, where Chapter 11 acts to rehabilitate an insolvent
business through reorganization.2' Similarly, Chapter 13 allows a debtor
ensuring a 'fresh start' for individual debtors . . . are at the core of federal
bankruptcy law").
13 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1997).
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2003). Corporations and partnerships may also use
Chapter 7, subject to certain limitations, because they are defined as a "person"
under the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). For simplicity's sake, this Note will be
confined to individual, "natural person" Chapter 7 debtors.
5 For purposes of Chapter 7, this trustee is usually a "private trustee" appointed
by the U.S. trustee for the region, see 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1), but the U.S. trustee
has broad discretion to supervise the administration of Chapter 7 cases himself. See
28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A)-(H) for a list of situations where the U.S. trustee may
take over "whenever the United States trustee considers it appropriate ......
6 TABB, supra note 13, at 2.
17 Id.
18 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 12 (1993).
'9 See id.
2°1d. at 12-13. A simple example to illustrate: Debtor files Chapter 7 and owes
Creditor an unsecured debt of $1000. Debtor's liquidated non-exempt, non-
encumbered property amounts to $10,000 and his aggregate unsecured debt is
$40,000. Based on these facts, Creditor will receive $0.25 for every dollar he is
owed. Thus, Debtor receives $250 and is barred from collecting the remaining
$750.
21 TABB, supra note 13, at 6.
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meeting certain requirements to enter into a plan to repay creditors
gradually over a period of years.22 The philosophy behind both Chapters 11
and 13 is to encourage debtors to restructure rather than simply liquidate
their assets.3 Since the concept of discharge is only relevant in Chapter 7
bankruptcies, this Note will not further discuss the other chapters of
bankruptcy.24 Likewise, since discharge and the exceptions to discharge in
section 523 apply only to individual debtors, 25 corporate and business entity
bankruptcies will not be discussed.
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code contains the exceptions to
discharge.26 If a debt is excepted from discharge, the creditor can not only
share in the bankruptcy distribution, but also collect on the debt after
bankruptcy.27 Note that discharge (and exceptions to discharge) is not about
dividing up the bankruptcy estate; the bankruptcy court's determination of
debt dischargeability is independent of questions such as the secured status
of debt,28 exempt property,29 or the priority of different claims.30
22 See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 1-8 to 1-9.
23 See TABB, supra note 13, § 1.2.
24 For a concise discussion of bankruptcy chapters other than Chapter 7, see
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 1-8 to 1-10.
25 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(1), 523(a) (2003).
26 See id. § 523.
27 TABB, supra note 13, at 693. Expanding upon the example in footnote 20,
assume now that Debtor and Creditor used to be married and the $1,000 debt is
alimony owed to Creditor. Because alimony is one of the exceptions to discharge
under the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), Creditor can share in the
bankruptcy estate just as in the previous example (receiving $250) and now, by
virtue of alimony payments being nondischargeable, Creditor can collect the
remainder of the debt after bankruptcy.
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). "An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest.., is a secured claim to the extent of
the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property . I.." Id.
29 "Exempt property" means property that will not be lost in a Chapter 7
liquidation. Some common examples of exempt property are the debtor's home, id.
§ 522(d)(1), car, id. § 522(d)(2), household goods, id. § 522(d)(3), and retirement
benefits, id. § 522(d)(10). Note that these exemptions are not wholesale exemptions
and are circumscribed by dollar amounts or other limitations. See, e.g., id. §
522(d)(2) (setting $17,425 as the ceiling for protection under the homestead
exemption); In re Fisher, 63 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986) (determining a
debtor's need and ability to provide for himself upon retirement before granting an
exemption for retirement savings).
30 See id. § 507 (providing the rank of priorities).
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B. Securities Law
1. General Legal Concepts
Section 523(a)(19) makes debts from any violation of state or federal
securities laws nondischargeable. 3' The two main sources of federal
securities law are the Securities Act of 193332 ("the 1933 Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 193433 ("the 1934 Act"). "The fundamental
purpose undergirding the [1933 Act and 1934 Act] is 'to eliminate serious
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market."' 34 The enactment of the
1933 and 1934 Acts was a reaction to the "outrageous conduct of securities
promoters" that contributed to the stock market crash of 1929.3' The 1933
Act primarily regulates securities when they are initially offered to the
public,36 while the 1934 Act is much broader in scope and deals with a
variety of transactions involving stocks and other securities when they are
in the market.37
A company's stock is subject to the reporting provisions of the 1934
Act if that particular class of stock trades on a national exchange 38 or if the
class of stock has more than five hundred shareholders and is worth more
than ten million dollars.39 Additionally, each state has legislation-
generically termed "blue sky laws"--in place to regulate securities. While
these state blue sky laws can "vary widely in their terms and scope," most
states have adopted some form of the Uniform Securities Act.4 The 1933
Act, the 1934 Act, and the state blue sky laws are not mutually exclusive-
an issuer could conceivably be subject to all three in a single transaction.
2. Statutory Definition of "Security"
Both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act define "security." While the two
Acts' definitions vary slightly, they are treated as the same.4'
31 Id. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i).
32 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77z-3 (2003).
33 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a to 78mm.
341 d. (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)).
35 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6 (3d ed. 1996).
36 Id. at7.
37 Id. at 8.
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (2002).
39 See id. § 781(g)(1); 17 C.F.R § 240.12g-1 (2002).
40 HAZEN, supra note 35, at 388-89.
"' See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (holding that the
respective definitions of "security" in the 1934 and 1933 Acts are "virtually
identical").
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The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or
lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
42
In enacting such a long-winded definition, Congress aimed to paint with a
"broad brush."43 Courts have often gone beyond a mechanical application
of the statutory definition; in determining whether an instrument is a
security, a court is not bound by "legal formalisms" but is to look to the
"economics of the transaction" in question."
3. Judicial Interpretation of "Security"
"Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate
investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they
are called."45 For example, even though the 1934 Act includes "note" in its
definition of the term "security," it is not axiomatic that a court will hold
that any note is a security--the "family resemblance" test must be
applied.46
In evaluating whether the instrument is a security, a court begins with
a rebuttable presumption that the instrument is a security due to the
42 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
43 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990).
44 See id. at 61.
45 Id.
46 To illustrate, Issuer sells promissory notes to Investor to raise money. Subse-
quently, Issuer becomes insolvent, and Investor's promissory notes become
virtually worthless. Investor alleges that Issuer violated antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act and seeks rescission of the sale of the promissory notes. Therefore, the
question of whether the notes are "securities" under the 1934 Act becomes
determinative of whether the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act apply.
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inclusion of "note" in the 1934 Act definition.47 Next, a court looks to the
judicially crafted list of exceptions to finding a note as a security (for
example, a note delivered in consumer financing or a note secured by a
mortgage on a home).48 If the note is found to bear a "family resemblance"
to one of the exceptions, the initial presumption that the instrument is a
security is rebutted.49
The Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.5" is the best
example of the expansiveness of the statutory definition. Howey involved
interpretation of the term "investment contract," which is included in the
statutory definition of "security" in section 2(l). W.J. Howey Co., a large
Florida orange grower, sold plots of its orchard to mostly out-of-state
businesses and professionals. Howey offered both a land sales contract and
a service contract to potential investors; the land sales contract conveyed
a narrow strip of land consisting of a row of trees, and the service contract
provided that Howey would cultivate the fruit. No registration statement
was filed with the SEC when Howey sold these contracts nor were these
interests evidenced by formal certificates. If the contracts and the deed
were "separate transactions involving no more than an ordinary real estate
sale and an agreement by the seller to manage the property for the buyer"52
as Howey argued, then there was no obligation to register; if these contracts
were "securities" under the 1934 Act, then the failure to register would be
a ground for rescission. 3
Emphasizing substance over form, the Court found the combination of
the contracts and the deed was an "investment contract. 54 All the elements
41 See Reves, 494 U.S. at 67; 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l).
4 See Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.49 Id. at 66-67. In determining whether the instrument bears a "family resem-
blance," Reves provides a four-part test:
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would
prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it .... Second, we exa-
mine the 'plan of distribution' of the instrument .... Third, we examine
the reasonable expectations of the investing public .... Finally, we exa-
mine whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory
scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering
application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.
Id. (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).
'0 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
52 Howey, 328 U.S. at 297-98.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10), 78e; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)(A)(i) (2003).54 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
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of a profit-seeking business venture were present: the investors were
contributing money to share in the profits of an enterprise managed and
operated by Howey; the investors had no desire to operate their orange
groves themselves; and the "common enterprise" was essential for the
investors to receive a return on their investment.55 This is the type of
agreement that the Supreme Court has held to be an investment contract
56
and thus a security.57 The Court held, "[A]n investment contract for
purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3]
is led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party..... ."S This is popularly known as the "Howey test."
The requirement in Howey that investors' profits result "solely" from
the efforts of the promoter or third party has been softened in subsequent
cases. "A literal application of the Howey test would frustrate the remedial
purposes of the Act.... [I]t would be easy to evade [the Howey test] by
adding a requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort."59
Therefore, only if the investor's efforts are "undeniably significant" will
the enterprise lose investment contract status. 60
To determine whether the investor is involved in a "common enterprise,"
the second element of the Howey test, courts have developed the concepts of
"horizontal" and "vertical commonality." Horizontal commonality is defined
as the relationship "between an individual investor and the pool of other
investors."' In Howey, horizontal commonality is present because each
investor pooled his or her money with all the other investors' money.62
1I Id. at 299-300.
56 See id. at 300.
"See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
s8Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
9 SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974)
(internal quotations omitted).
6"Id. at 483 n. 14 (citing Securities Act Release No. 5211 [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,446 (Nov. 30, 1971), which provides liberal
interpretation of this element and cites Howey as a mandate from the Supreme
Court to focus on the "economic reality" of the transaction); accord SEC v. Glen
W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). For deeper analysis of this
element, see HAZEN, supra note 35, at 31-32.
61 Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221
(6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
62 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 296. The proceeds from the sale of fruit were
distributed pro rata by shares, not by the discrete production of each investor's plot.
Id. Note that the Supreme Court did not use the terms "vertical commonality" and
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Vertical commonality occurs when the investors' fortunes are tied to the
efforts and success of the promoter.63
This brief summary of securities law is intended not only to provide
enough information to understand section 523(a)(19), but also to illustrate
the broad scope of the term "security." A grasp of the volume and
complexity of this area of the law is necessary to understand the gravity of
section 523(a)(19), which incorporates the totality of securities law into a
single exception to discharge.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES MADE BY SECTION 523(A)(19)
TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR NONDISCHARGEABILITY BASED ON FRAUD
The new bankruptcy provision, section 523(a)(19), reads:
(a) A discharge under... this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-
(19) that-
(A) is for-
(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that
term is defined in § 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), any State securities laws, or
any regulation or order issued under such Federal or State
securities laws; or
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security; and
(B) results from--
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in
any Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding;
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; or
"horizontal commonality" in Howey. See id. These terms were subsequently deve-
loped in the lower courts.
63 See, e.g., Turner, 474 F.2d at 483 (finding a pyramid scheme to be a security
despite the absence of horizontal pooling among investors). For a skillful
navigation through the concepts of horizontal and vertical commonality, see
generally Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135
(1995) (identifying three different approaches to the commonality requirement
among the circuits: horizontal commonality, strict vertical commonality, and the
"broad vertical approach").
2003-20041
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(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine,
penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement
payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed by the
debtor.6
The definition of "securities laws" for purposes of section 523(a)(19)
includes both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.65 Not only must the debt
involve a violation of these securities laws, it must also result from a
judgment or settlement of a court or administrative proceeding.
The following sections examine the ways that section 523(a)(19) has
altered the requirements of section 523(a)(2) when the debt involves a
security.
A. The Merging of the Reliance Requirement: Subsections (A) and (B)
When the Debt Involves Fraud in the Purchase or Sale of a Security
1. Reliance under Section 523(a)(2)
The most litigated exception to discharge is for debts incurred by fraud
under section 523(a)(2).6 Section 523(a)(2)(B) ("Subsection (B)") applies
to false representations of financial condition made in writing, while
section 523(a)(2)(A) ("Subsection (A)") is a broad "catch all" and deals
with all other representations not covered in Subsection (B).6 7 This Note
will refer to Subsection (A) statements as "oral false financial statements"
for the sake of simplicity. Subsection (B) statements will be referred to as
"written false financial statements."
The elements of Subsection (B) are: (1) the statement must be written
and "materially false;" (2) the statement must be "respecting the debtor's
or an insider's financial condition;" (3) the creditor must reasonably rely
' 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2003).65
The term "securities laws" means the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.
§ 77a et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.),
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 79a et seq.) [15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq.], the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (15 U.S.C. 77aaa et seq.), the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a- 1 et seq.), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(15 U.S.C. 80b et seq.) [15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-1 et seq.], and the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.).
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47).
TABB, supra note 13, at 715.
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2); TABB, supra note 13, at 715.
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on the statement; and (4) the debtor must have intended to deceive the
creditor. 6' The elements of Subsection (A) are "false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition....
While Subsection (B) requires the creditor's reliance on the written
financial statement to be reasonable, there is no such express requirement
in Subsection (A). However, the Supreme Court has read in a justified
reliance standard. "Justifiable" is a more relaxed standard of reliance than
"reasonable."7 As this Note will show, the dual standard of reasonable
reliance for written false financial statements and justified reliance for oral
false financial statements no longer exists when the debt involves a
judgment of common law fraud involving the purchase or sale of a security
under subsection 523(a)(19).
To obtain a finding of nondischargeability under Subsection (A), the
Supreme Court held that the creditor must manifest justified reliance. In
analyzing Subsection (A), which has no express reliance requirement, the
Court in Field v. Mans applied various rules of construction to hold that the
reasonable reliance requirement in Subsection (B) was not intended to
apply to Subsection (A).71 The Court, however, held that in drafting
Subsection (A) and including the term "actual fraud,"' 2 Congress referred
to common-law fraud. Therefore, a creditor must "justifiably," rather than
reasonably, rely on the debtor's statement. 3 On a continuum with reason-
able reliance on one side and "mere reliance" (that is, subjective reliance)
on the other, the Supreme Court would place justifiable reliance somewhere
in the middle. 4 The Court explained that "a person is justified in relying on
a representation of fact 'although he might have ascertained the falsity of
the representation had he made an investigation.""'5 To manifestjustifiable
reliance, the creditor need not investigate, even if he could have done so
"without any considerable trouble or expense."' 6 Only if the falsity would
68 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B).
69 Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
70 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 68, 74-75 (1995).
See id. at 67-70, 74-75.
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
73 Field, 516 U.S. at 73-75.
14 See id. at 72-73 (referring to justified reliance as an "intermediate level"
between reasonable reliance and mere reliance).
75 See id. at 70 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976)).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 cmt. a.
2003-2004]
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have been disclosed by "a mere cursory glance" will the creditor be found
to fail the requirement of justified reliance.77
2. Section 523(a)(2) after Section 523(a)(19)
Section 523(a)(19) includes judgments of "common law fraud.., in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" as a basis for
nondischaregeability." This explicit reference to "common law fraud"
hearkens back to the Supreme Court's application ofjustifiable reliance in
Field. What was once two different standards of reliance for written fraud
and oral fraud under section 523(a)(2) is now only one standard of reliance
for fraud involving the purchase or sale of securities under section
523(a)(19).
To illustrate the significance of this change, consider the following
example.7 9 Debtor, a shareholder of Corporation, sells some of his common
shares of Corporation to Creditor. Debtor provides a written financial
statement showing that Corporation's assets are substantially higher than
its liabilities, that its orange groves and related real property are free from
any mortgage or lien, and that its investors have enjoyed a substantial rate
of return on their investment. Creditor gives the financial statement a
cursory read-through, finds nothing that causes him concern, and buys
Debtor's shares in the orange grove. Unbeknownst to Creditor, the financial
statement is completely false. The orange grove is heavily leveraged, its
real property is heavily mortgaged, and its investors have consistently lost
money on their investment. Creditor files suit and receives a judgment
against Debtor for common law fraud. Subsequently, Debtor files a petition
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Before section 523(a)(19), Creditor would be
relegated to section 523(a)(2)(B) and would have to show that he reason-
ably relied on Debtor's false financial statement. After section 523(a)(19),
Creditor must only show that he justifiably relied on the statement.
Because the debt incurred involved common law fraud in the purchase
or sale of a security, section 523(a)( 19) is applicable.80 Creditor could have
discovered that the financial statement was false if he had performed a
reasonable investigation. Under this standard of justifiable reliance, an
77 See id.
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(ii) (2003).79This illustration is loosely based on the facts of Howey. Analysis of reason-
ableness has been simplified for illustrative purposes.
" See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(ii).
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investigation is not required even though it could be done easily and
inexpensively. 8' Instead, the justifiable reliance standard was met by
Creditor's "cursory glance" at the financial statement.82 Since this glance
would not reveal the fraud, Creditor would have justifiably relied on the
false financial statement. The result is that Debtor's debt to Creditor is
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
All that said, this point is largely academic: aggrieved shareholders will
almost certainly use a private cause of action provided by one of the
Securities Acts rather than sue on grounds of common law fraud because
of the procedural and substantive advantages afforded to plaintiffs in the
1933 and 1934 Acts discussed below. Congress' inclusion of "common law
fraud" in section 523(a)(19) is likely an effort to cover all of its bases by
broad drafting, rather than the conscious establishment of a separate cause
of action.
3. Reliance in Violations of Securities Laws
Section 5 of the 1933 Act requires an issuer83 to file a registration
statement with the SEC before selling or offering its securities.8 4 Section
12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act provides that "any person who offers or sells a
security in violation of section [5] ... shall be liable ... to the person
purchasing such security from him . ..."85 Therefore, if an issuer sells a
security8 6 or offers to sell or buy before the registration statement becomes
effective,87 the issuer has violated section 12(a)(1) and any debt resulting
from such a judgment would be nondischargeable.
Even if an issuer sells a security and has filed a registration statement,
the issuer is far from in the clear. Section 11 of the 1933 Act grants a cause
of action to "any person acquiring" a security if "the registration statement
... contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
81 See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 cmt. a.
82 id.
83 Section 2(4) of the 1933 Act provides the definition of "issuer." See 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4).
4 See id. § 77e(a)(1), (c) (proscribing the sale of securities unless a registration
statement is in effect and proscribing offers to sell or buy unless a registration
statement has been filed). For purposes of this Note, the liability of all participants
other than the issuer-while a significant focus of the 1933 Act-will be ignored.
85 d. § 771(a)(1).
86 Id. § 77e(a)(1).
87 Id. § 77e(c).
2003-2004]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading.... .""
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) have weight in bankruptcy court after section
523(a)(19). Recall that before Sarbanes-Oxley, an aggrieved creditor/
shareholder would be relegated to fitting his claim under section 523(a)(2),
proving either reasonable or justifiable reliance. 9 Now, a section 12
plaintiff/creditor need not prove reliance to have his claim declared
nondischargeable. The requirements of section 12 are (1) the offer or sale
of a security must be through interstate commerce, (2) it must include an
untrue statement of fact or an omission, and (3) the section 12
plaintiff/creditor must not know of its falsity. 9 Some courts have gone so
far as to hold that a plaintiff/creditor may recover under section 12 even if
he did not read the prospectus provided by the issuer.9" Similarly, a plaintiff
under section 11 does not have to prove reliance. A prima facie case is
made upon a showing that the misstatement or omission was material.92
Section 523(a)( 19) also serves to include court-made securities laws as
a basis for nondischargeability. "Fraud-on-the-market theory" is ajudicially
crafted doctrine within Rule 1Ob-5 of the 1934 Act. Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits
any misleading statements involving the purchase or sale of any security.93
The elements necessary to sustain a lOb-5 action are the same as the
88 Id. § 77k(a).
89 See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
90 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
" See Caviness v. DeRand Res. Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1305 (4th Cir. 1993).92See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (holding
that an issuer's liability is "virtually absolute" upon a showing of materiality).
Section 11 is softened somewhat by the "due diligence" defenses in 1933 Act §
11 (b). Note also that the 1933 Act provides a broad class of defendants for
violations of sections 11 and 12. In addition to the laundry list of persons liable
under [section 1 1(a)], section 15 imposes liability on "control persons":
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or
who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with
one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under sections [ 11 ] or [ 12] of this title,
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o.
93 See 17 C.F.R § 240.1Ob-5 (2003).
(VOL. 92
CLOSING A BANKRUPTCY LOOP-HOLE
elements of common law fraud: materiality, reliance, causation, and dam-
ages.94
The idea behind fraud-on-the-market theory is that the plaintiff relies
not on the actual false statement, but on the market price which reflects the
false statement. In a face-to-face transaction, the question is whether the
buyer relied on the seller's statement. "With the presence of [an efficient
market],"95 however, "the market is interposed between the seller and buyer
and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form
of a market price., 96 "In an open and developed market, the dissemination
of material misrepresentations or withholding of material information
typically affects the price of stock, and purchasers generally rely on the
price of stock as a reflection of its value."9 7 Fraud-on-the-market theory
allows the plaintiff to satisfy the reliance requirement under Rule lOb-5
without actually relying on the false statement.98 Once a material mis-
representation has been established, the only remaining requirement is
the plaintiff must show that the market prices reacted to the misstate-
ments.99 Under section 523(a)(2), prior to section 523(a)(19), a debtor had
to prove that he either justifiably or reasonably relied on the false financial
statement.'00 Now the investors of publicly-traded bankrupt companies can
avail themselves of fraud-on-the-market theory as a basis for non-
dischargeability, even when they did not rely on or even know of the state-
ment.
B. False Statements of Financial Condition under Section 523(a)(2);
New Standards of Fraudulent Intent for Debtors When the Debt
Involves a Security
1. Fraudulent Intent in Section 523(a)(2)
In addition to lowering the creditor's standard of reliance from that in
section 523(a)(2), 0 ' section 523(a)(19) also changes the standard of the
94 HAZEN, supra note 35, at 770.
9' Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988) (recognizing that one
of the predicates for application of fraud-on-the-market theory is an "efficient
market" on which the security trades).
96 Id. at 244 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
98 See HAZEN, supra note 35, at 812.
99In re Compaq Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (citing
in part Basic, 485 U.S. at 247).
1oo See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
o1' See supra Part II.A.2.
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debtor's fraudulent intent. °2 The element of fraudulent intent is more
important in Subsection (B), false written statements, than it is in
Subsection (A), false oral statements. In Subsection (A) actions, fraudulent
intent can be inferred from a showing that the false statement was
material. 103 Therefore, this Note only examines the changes to the standard
of intent as they relate to written false financial statements.
2. Fraudulent Intent for Violations of Securities Laws
There are numerous statutes and regulations requiring registration of
securities in the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, and state blue sky laws. Generally,
a registration statement will include information about the company's
operations, financial history, accounts receivable, management structure,
and other information relevant to an investor. 1
04
Some securities laws do not require the purchaser to show the
fraudulent intent of the issuer. For example, section 11 (a) of the 1933 Act
grants securities purchasers a cause of action when a registration statement
contains "an untrue statement of material fact or omit[s] to state a material
fact."'0 5 Liability under section 11 is not premised on fraudulent intent.
Issuers are, in effect, strictly liable for misstatements; 0 6 "the plaintiff need
only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie
case."' 07 "The only defenses are the purchaser's knowledge of the inaccur-
acies, lack of materiality, or expiration of the statute of limitations."'0 8
,02 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2003).
103 Carini v. Matera, 592 F.2d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1979).
'o See generally HAZEN, supra note 35, § 3.
101 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2003).
106 SeeIn re Ann Taylor Stores Sec. Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 997-98 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) ("An issuer has absolute liability for any misrepresentations or omis-
sions .... ).
'07 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983).
108 HAZEN, supra note 35, at 338. To illustrate how such a violation of section
11 of the 1933 Act might occur yet remain dischargeable under the Code before
section 523(a)(19), assume Debtor is the sole shareholder of Corporation. Creditor
wishes to purchase Corporation. Debtor issues a written financial statement
regarding the finances of Corporation that is materially false because the financial
statement was negligently prepared. Debtor does not, however, publish the
statement with an intent to deceive. Relying on the false financial statement,
Creditor purchases Corporation by buying all of Debtor's stock. Subsequently,
Corporation turns out to be worthless and Debtor files for bankruptcy. Based on
these facts, Creditor could not succeed in the Subsection (B) exception to discharge
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Similarly, section 14(a) of the 1934 Act does not require scienter to
establish liability for a violation of the proxy rules. A negligence standard
is applied to material omissions in proxy statements; the only requirement
is that the drafters knew all of the facts behind the material omissions in the
solicitation statement. 109
As a result of section 523(a)(19), a debtor can now use any of these
violations of securities laws as a basis for nondischargeability because there
is no intent requirement. l l Violation of securities laws as a basis for
nondischargeability in the buying and selling of a business is especially
important since the Supreme Court narrowed the "sale of business"
exception. Although the 1933 Act expressly provides that stock is a
security,1 1' the "sale of business" doctrine provides an exception: "[T]he
sale of stock in a closely held corporation may not be a 'security' especially
if it is, in essence, a transfer of ownership and management of the corpor-
ation's assets."'1 12 After the Supreme Court's decision in Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth'13 the validity of this doctrine is in question. 14
In Landreth Timber the majority owner of a lumber mill sold his
business.'15 The sale of the stock was not registered as required in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933.116 The buyer sued for contract rescission
based on the failure to register under the 1933 Act. 17 As a defense, the
seller asserted the "sale of business" exception to registration and argued
that the transaction was not for the sale of a security as defined in the
Act."' The Court held that the buyer was a "passive investor" who did not
contemplate running the business himself and, therefore, the statutory
definition of security was satisfied. 19
After section 523(a)(19), it is plain to see the gravitas of the Landreth
Timber decision in bankruptcy court when an exchange of stock is utilized
to sell a business and there is a failure to register. With the "sale of
because there was no intent on Debtors's part to deceive, the last element of
Subsection (B). See supra text accompanying note 68.
109 SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1268 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Fradkin v.
Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
110 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
112 HAZEN, supra note 35, § 1, at 40.
"3 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
"4 See generally HAZEN, supra note 35, § 3, at 40.
..5 Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 684.
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (2003).
1 7 Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 684.
18id.
119 See id. at 695-96.
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business" doctrine in question and a violation of securities laws as a basis
for nondischargability, a creditor is no longer confined to Subsection (B)
where he has to prove the fraudulent intent of the debtor. Rather, the
creditor can use the debtor's violation of the registration requirement as a
basis for nondischargeability and need not show that the debtor had
fraudulent intent. Indeed, if the parties from Landreth Timber declared
bankruptcy and section 523(a)(19) were in place, their debt to the buyer
would not be dischargeable because of their failure to register.120
3. Incorporation of the Terms "Deceit" and "Manipulation"
The most cryptic provision in section 523(a)(19) is the exception to
discharge for "deceit or manipulation in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security."' 21 Presumably, the terms "deceit" and "manipulation"
-reference the terms' meanings in securities law, 22 namely, section 10b of
the 1934 Act titled "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devi-
ces."'123 However, the entire 1934 Act, including section 10b, was already
incorporated in the preceding subsection of section 523(a)(19).' 24 Because
violation of securities laws is included in the preceding subsection, 25 an
argument could be made that the terms "deceit" and "manipulation" must
be given a different interpretation.126 The counter-argument is that inter-
'20 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) (2003).
12 Id. § 523(a)(19)(A)(ii).
122 G. Ray Warner, Accounting Reform Law Adds Broad Securities Fraud
Discharge Exception, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 43, 44 (2002).
123 17 C.F.R § 240, lOb-5 (2003).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
124 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i).
125 See id.
126 Warner, supra note 122, at 44.
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pretation of these terms as anything other than their meaning in section 1 Ob
and Rule lOb-5 is contrary to the Supreme Court's "plain meaning"
interpretation of bankruptcy statutes. 127 This part of section 523(a)(19) will
require judicial interpretation.
1 28
Neither the 1933 and 1934 Acts nor academic commentary provide a
clear, black-letter definition of "manipulation."' 2 9 The clearest definition
of manipulation is a trade made with "bad" intent.130 Presumably, "bad"
intent is at a slightly lower level than fraudulent intent. There are two
alternative formulations suggested. The first is that manipulation means
"'conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price to
an artificial level.' ,13 The second definition is "'deliberate interference
with the free play of supply and demand in the security markets.' ,132
Applying the meaning of "manipulation" from securities law, a debtor
manipulates a security if he "intended to raise the price of the stock to, or
maintain the price of the stock at an artificial level.... 133 This bodes well
for stockholders looking to recover debts from personally liable corporate
executives. Subject to further judicial interpretation of the terms "deceit"
and "manipulation" found in section 523(a)(19), these losses might be
nondischargeable in individual bankruptcies.
27 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989)
(holding that the Court should examine a statute's plain meaning when determining
whether bankruptcy laws permit recovery of post petition interest).
'2 See Warner, supra note 122, at 44 (stating that use of the terms "deceit" and
"manipulation" require judicial interpretation).
129 See David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 503, 506 (1991) ("[N]o satisfactory definition of
['manipulation'] exists. Indeed, neither the Securities Exchange Act nor the
Commodity Exchange Act attempts to define the term, even though both have the
prevention of manipulation as a primary goal. Academic commentary in this area
also has been unhelpful.").
130 See id. at 510 (providing three conditions to "bad" intent on the part of a
trade: "(1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the
trader has no belief that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade;
and (3) the resulting profit comes solely from the trader's ability to move prices and
not from his possession of valuable information").
'' Id. at 507 (quoting Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 393 (1990)).
'
32 Id. (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., STOCK MARKET CONTROL
107 (Alfred L. Berheim et al., eds., 1934)).
133 United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383, 1394 (2d Cir. 1996).
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C. Abrogation of the Exception to Section 523(a)(2)(A) for Statements
Regarding an Insider's Financial Condition Involving Securities
An exception to Subsection (A), oral false financial statements, is for
those statements regarding an insider's financial condition."' The Code
provides that when a debtor is an individual, an "insider" is the "corpor-
ation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control." '135 This
exception to discharge comes up when'a debtor guarantees repayment of a
loan to his or her business or otherwise becomes personally liable for the
business' debts.
36
To illustrate, Debtor is the president and sole shareholder of
Corporation. Corporation is an "insider" of Debtor."3 Debtor makes a false
oral statement to Creditor regarding the financial condition of Corporation
and personally guarantees repayment of the loans. Creditor lends Debtor
money relying on the false oral statement. Although the statements
inducing the debt are false, and even though false oral statements are
nondischargeable under Subsection (A),"3 the debt is dischargeable in
bankruptcy as an exception to Subsection (A) for statements regarding the
financial condition of an insider.13 1 Section 523(a)(19), however, scales
back much of this exception by making debts incurred through violation of
state or federal securities laws nondischargeable 40
In re Richey"' serves as a concrete example of a dischargeability issue
that would have come out differently if section 523(a)(19) were applied.
Richey, the debtor and sole shareholder of a trucking company, induced
Harper to purchase shares of the company by claiming that there would be
a high rate of return on his money. 42 Harper purchased 1600 shares of
common stock of the trucking company. 4 3 Richey did not provide any
'34 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2003).
"'35 Id. § 101 (31)(A)(iv). Caution to those unfamiliar with bankruptcy law: this
definition of "insider" is counterintuitive and difficult to digest.
136 See, e.g., Blackwell v. Dabney (In re Blackwell), 702 F.2d 490,491 (4th Cir.
1983).
131 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(iv) (2003) (defining "insider").
138 See id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
139 See, e.g., Blackwell, 702 F.2d at 492; In re Richey, 103 B.R. 25, 29 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1989).
1
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A).
14' Richey, 103 B.R. at 25.
142 Id. at 27. Richey claimed that the stock was a "good investment" and that
Harper could hope to double his money. Id.
143 Id. at 28.
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written financial statements to Harper before the stock was purchased. 44
Richey declared bankruptcy and the court held that his debt to Harper
was dischargeable because Richey's statement was "respecting . . . an
insider's financial condition."'45 The court held that Richey may have
violated Connecticut state securities laws, 46 but "a violation of a state
statute does not impute ipso facto the necessary elements of a nondis-
chargeability offense... ... 4' After section 523(a)(19), however, a viola-
tion of Connecticut state securities laws would "impute ipso facto" the
elements of a nondischargeable debt,'48 and Richey's debt would not be
dischargeable in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
In enacting section 523(a)(19), Congress was particularly concerned
with the executives of large publicly-held corporations discharging their
securities law debts in bankruptcy through "loopholes."'149 However, the
Author questions the precision with which section 523(a)(19) addresses
these concerns.
First, Senator Leahy claimed there were "loopholes" for debt from
securities laws violations under the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley version of the
Bankruptcy Code. 50 Presumably, this means that such debts were not per
se nondischargeable. Before section 523(a)(19), creditors with judgments
of securities laws violations had to fit their claims under one of the
exceptions to discharge, such as fraudulent oral or written statements,1
5'
144Id. at 27-28.
"'5 Id. at 29.
'46Id. at 30 (holding that Richey "may have" violated CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-
472 (West 1987 and Supp. 1989) (no person may sell a security by making "any
untrue statement of material fact")).
147 Id. (quoting In re Allen, 25 B.R. 566, 569-70 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)).
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) (2003).
149 See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 16 (2002), 2002 WL 863249; see also Press
Release, Federal Document Clearing House, McCain Backs Leahy Amendment
Against Corporate and Criminal Fraud (July 10, 2002), 2002 WL 7273268.
150 See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 16.
'5 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
"(a) [T]his title does not discharge any individual debtor from any debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extenstion, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud ...
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breach of fiduciary duty, 52 or intentional torts.'53 Yet, in classifying every
violation of securities laws as nondischargeable, Congress has subsumed
much of the fine-tuning it had previously crafted with the exceptions to
discharge.
Second, even though Congress was focusing on Enron when it
promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, some parts of section 523(a)(19) will
affect smaller issuers more than large, publicly-held issuers. For example,
the rule for oral false financial statements regarding the financial condition
of an insider was never available for executives of publicly held companies
because, by definition, they would not be the sole shareholder. Ironically,
small business owners/debtors, and not Fortune 500 executives, will feel
the brunt of this particular aspect of the amendment to the Code. Perhaps
Congress should have included only 1934 Act violations and not 1933 Act
violations as a basis for non-dischargeability if it had wanted to focus
section 523(a)(19) on large publicly-held companies.
Finally, how this amendment will affect the "fresh start" goal of
bankruptcy remains to be seen. In the scale between the creditor's interests
in fulfilling his claims and the debtor's interest of receiving a "fresh start,"
Congress may have dramatically tipped the balance in favor of creditors in
enacting section 523(a)(19).
See also In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1991) (providing an elaborative
five-part test to see if a debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2): "the
creditor must show that: (1) the debtor made the representations; (2) that at the time
he knew they were false; (3) that he made them with the intention and purpose of
deceiving the creditor; (4) that the creditor relied on such representations; (5) that
the creditor sustained the alleged loss and damage as the proximate result of the
representations having been made").
'52 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) ("(a) [T]his title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt-(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny....").
' Id. § 523(a)(6) ("[T]his title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt--(6) for willful or malicious injury by the debtor....").
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